

26th JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BOSSIER, LOUISIANA

ANTHONY MONROE,

Plaintiff,

v.

TERRY CONNER, RICHARD MATTHEWS,
LAMAR DAVIS, CHAVEZ CAMMON, and
JOHN DOE OFFICER, and JOHN DOE
SUPERVISOR

Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION

Docket No. _

Judge:

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

PETITION

Plaintiff, Anthony Monroe, by and through his undersigned counsel, hereby files this
Petition against the below named Defendants. In support, he states the following:

INTRODUCTION

1. On November 29, 2019, Plaintiff Anthony Monroe (“Mr. Monroe”) - a Black man - was
violently beaten by two Louisiana State Police (“LSP”) officers.
2. This was not the first instance of a Black person being attacked by LSP officers.
3. LSP has a long history of violence, discrimination, and police misconduct against Black
people.¹ Just six months prior to Mr. Monroe’s attack, 49-year-old Ronald Greene was
killed by LSP officers during an arrest and violent beat down. A subsequent cover-up by
LSP sparked national outrage and multiple calls for a federal Department of Justice (DOJ)
probe.² Moreover, external investigations have revealed a long pattern of racist violence

¹ See, e.g., Timothy Bella, *State troopers texted about the ‘whoopin’ they gave a Black man, records show: ‘He’s gonna have nightmares,’* The Washington Post (Mar. 13, 2021, 4:29 PM), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/03/13/louisiana-police-black-man-text/>; Jim Mustian et al., *Beatings, buried videos a pattern at Louisiana State Police*, AP News (Sept. 8, 2021), <https://apnews.com/article/police-beatings-louisiana-video-91168d2848b10df739d73cc35b0c02f8>.

² Alanah Odoms et al., *Pattern-or-Practice Investigation into Louisiana State Police*, ACLU Louisiana (Aug. 27, 2021), https://www.laclu.org/sites/default/files/8.27.21_letter_to_doj_re_lsp_investigation.pdf.



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Katie F. Best

Bossier Parish
Clerk of Court

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and corruption by LSP.³ Ronald Greene’s death, along with countless other less publicized cases, shed light on the rampant misconduct and brutality that has plagued LSP for years.⁴

4. A review by the Associated Press of internal records and videos related to at least a dozen cases revealed that, over the past decade, LSP officers or supervisors ignored or concealed evidence of beatings, including turning off body cameras, rubberstamping use-of-force reports without reviewing body camera footage, and lying about suspects being violent to justify use of excessive force.⁵
5. Mr. Monroe is just one of many other victims who has suffered violence at the hands of LSP and its officers. Now, Mr. Monroe brings this lawsuit to redress the deprivation of his rights.
6. Mr. Monroe is among numerous Black men who have been brutalized by law enforcement without justification or justice.⁶
7. Mr. Monroe brings this action for (i) aggravated assault in violation of L.A. Rev. Stat. § 14:37; (ii) aggravated battery in violation of L.A. Rev. Stat. § 14:34; (iii) second degree battery in violation of L.A. Rev. Stat. § 14:34.1; and (iv) a violation of the Louisiana Public Records Law.
8. Tort actions premised on aggravated assault and/or aggravated battery are subject to a two-year statute of limitations in Louisiana.

THE PARTIES

9. Plaintiff Anthony Monroe is a man domiciled in the State of Louisiana.
10. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Richard Matthews (“Defendant Matthews”) was an officer at LSP. On information and belief, Defendant Matthews resides in Haughton,

³ *Id.*

⁴ Jim Mustian, *AP: Use of slurs not ‘isolated’ at Louisiana State Police*, AP News (Oct. 30, 2020), <https://apnews.com/article/race-and-ethnicity-louisiana-baton-rouge-racial-injustice-d7f77f196571892d71bd010ce4109677>.

⁵ *Beatings And Buried Videos Are A Pattern With The Louisiana State Police*, NPR (Sept. 9, 2021), <https://www.npr.org/2021/09/09/1035446605/louisiana-state-police-bodycam-videos-beatings>.

⁶ See Frank Edwards, et al., *Risk of being killed by police use of force in the United States by age, race – ethnicity, and sex*, 116 PNAS 16793, 16794 (2019) (finding that Black men are over two times more likely than white men to be killed by law enforcement); Mark Hoekstra & Carly Will Sloan, *Does Race Matter for Police Use of Force? Evidence from 911 Calls*, NBER (Feb. 2020), <https://www.nber.org/papers/w26774>.



Louisiana. Defendant Matthews is sued in his individual capacity, and at all relevant times, he was acting under the color of law of the State of Louisiana.

11. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Terry Conner (“Defendant Conner”) was an officer at LSP. On information and belief, Defendant Conner resides in Shreveport, Louisiana. Defendant Conner is sued in his individual capacity, and at all relevant times, he was acting under the color of law of the State of Louisiana.
12. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant John Doe Officer (“Defendant John Doe Officer”) was an officer at LSP. Mr. Monroe is not aware of the true name of Defendant John Doe, and therefore sues him by such fictitious name. On information and belief, Defendant John Doe Officer resides in the State of Louisiana. Defendant John Doe Officer is sued in his individual capacity, and at all relevant times, he was acting under the color of law of the State of Louisiana. Mr. Monroe will amend this complaint to state the true name of Defendant John Doe Officer when it has been ascertained.
13. Defendant Matthews and Defendant Conner, together with Defendant John Doe Officer, are “Defendant Officers.”
14. Defendant Lamar Davis (“Defendant Davis”) is the Superintendent of LSP and is the principal and final policymaker of LSP. He establishes the policies, practices, and customs used by LSP, and is responsible for the hiring, firing, training, and the supervision of all officers at LSP, including Defendant Officers. Defendant Davis is sued in his official capacity.
15. At all times relevant hereto, additional Defendant John Doe Supervisor of LSP (“Doe Supervisor”) was employed as an officer by LSP and was the direct supervisor of Defendant Officers. Mr. Monroe is not aware of the true names and capacities of Doe Supervisor and therefore sues by such fictitious names. On information and belief, Doe Supervisor resides in the State of Louisiana. Mr. Monroe will amend this complaint to state the true name and capacity of Doe Supervisor when such have been ascertained.
16. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Chavez Cammon (“Defendant Cammon”) was the Custodian of Records for LSP. Defendant Cammon is sued in his official capacity.



17. Defendants are liable jointly, severally, and in solido for the intentional, excessive, and/or otherwise tortious conduct set forth below.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

18. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court under La. Const. Ann. art. V, § 16 because this Court has original jurisdiction for all civil matters.

19. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to La. Stat. Ann. § 13:5104 because Defendants are law enforcement officers, and because the wrongful conduct at issue in this matter arose out of the discharge of Defendants' official duties, and because a substantial part of the events giving rise to Mr. Monroe's claims occurred in Bossier City, Louisiana, which is located within this District. See La. Stat. Ann. § 13:5104(a).

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Mr. Monroe's Drive Home

20. On November 29, 2019, at around 4:00 a.m., Mr. Monroe finished his shift at the Eldorado Casino in Shreveport, Louisiana, where he had worked as a blackjack dealer for twenty years.

21. After finishing his shift, Mr. Monroe wanted to pick up some food on the way back to his home. He got into his truck and drove in the direction toward his home.

22. Mr. Monroe was driving on Market Street and turned onto I-20, when he noticed an LSP officer following him. This LSP officer was Defendant Matthews.

23. Defendant Matthews continued to follow Mr. Monroe for several minutes without turning on any police lights.

24. Mr. Monroe turned off I-20 onto Traffic Street, which curved underneath the I-20 bridge.

25. It was especially dark underneath the bridge, and there were no other cars or people around, aside from Mr. Monroe and Defendant Matthews.

26. As Mr. Monroe approached underneath the bridge, Defendant Matthews suddenly turned his police lights on. But Mr. Monroe did not understand why Defendant Matthews had turned on his lights.

27. Mr. Monroe did not feel safe stopping underneath this bridge because it was very dark—only about 4:15 a.m. in the early morning with no sun or light out—and there were no other



cars or individuals around. Mr. Monroe had heard of police violence occurring in the area, and he was afraid of what might happen to him in the dark with no witnesses. He had seen many news stories in the last year of LSP officers illegally targeting African Americans, arresting them without probable cause, dragging them out of their cars, beating them up, and violating their constitutional rights. Mr. Monroe honestly feared being another victim on the news, especially in the dark, where he felt an LSP officer could do anything he wanted to him.

28. Mr. Monroe reasonably decided that it would be safer to pull over in a well-lit area so that it would be more probable that other people would be present to act as witnesses and potentially intervene in case the LSP officer became violent with him. Mr. Monroe drove out from under the dark bridge and began looking for an appropriate location with more light to safely pull over.

29. Mr. Monroe drove for less than a minute and pulled over at the first well-lighted area he found, which was the Boomtown Casino, located at 300 Riverside Drive in Bossier City.

Mr. Monroe's Illegal Arrest

30. Mr. Monroe pulled his truck into the valet area of the Boomtown Casino. He stopped his truck and stayed seated in the driver's seat. He remained calm despite being completely terrified—he thought he was going to be hurt or killed.

31. Mr. Monroe watched Defendant Matthews get out of his police car. Defendant Matthews walked up to Mr. Monroe's truck and stood behind the truck on the driver's side. Defendant Matthews reached for his gun, placing his hand over his gun in the holster.

32. Defendant Matthews demanded that Mr. Monroe exit his truck, without providing any reason or justification, with his hand on his gun.

33. Mr. Monroe was confused about being stopped for no apparent reason, terrified about what might happen to him if he got out of the truck, and fearful for his life given the history of police brutality in the area and the stories of Black victims on the news, so he reasonably remained seated in his truck.



34. Mr. Monroe, in his nervousness, called his mother on his cell phone. Mr. Monroe stayed on the phone with his mother as Defendant Matthews continued to demand that Mr. Monroe exit the truck.
35. Mr. Monroe told his mother over the phone that the officer had his hand on his gun.
36. Mr. Monroe spoke to Defendant Matthews through his rolled-down window. Mr. Monroe continued to ask for an explanation as to why he had been pulled over.
37. Defendant Matthews never provided Mr. Monroe with a valid reason for the stop, in violation of standard practice, and he continued to demand that Mr. Monroe exit his truck. Defendant Matthews claimed that Mr. Monroe was driving 45 mph in a 25 mph zone. But Mr. Monroe knew the claim was false because he knew he had not been driving 20 mph over the speed limit.⁷
38. Mr. Monroe's mother said to him over the phone, "don't give him a reason to pull his gun."
39. It was only then, after hearing Mr. Monroe's mother's statements over the truck's Bluetooth, that Defendant Matthews removed his hand from his gun and instead grabbed his flashlight. He shined his flashlight into the side mirror onto Mr. Monroe.
40. Mr. Monroe told Defendant Matthews that he had high blood pressure and general bad health, and that he feared for his health in this situation.
41. Mr. Monroe also told Defendant Matthews that he did not trust the situation and did not want to be handcuffed because of his medical conditions.
42. Mr. Monroe asked Defendant Matthews if he planned to handcuff him, and Defendant Matthews said no.
43. Mr. Monroe's mother, who was still on the phone and feared for her son's safety, told her son to get out of the truck. She told her son to not give the officer a reason to shoot him.
44. When Mr. Monroe stepped out of the truck, Defendant Matthews told Mr. Monroe that Mr. Monroe's arrest had to be done "the hard way." Defendant Matthews immediately reached for both of Mr. Monroe's wrists, contrary to his earlier representation to Mr. Monroe that

⁷ At no point did Defendant Matthews provide the real reason for why he pulled Mr. Monroe over, and the pretextual reason of speeding was proven to be just that—a pretext. The charge of speeding was dismissed by the district attorney on September 3, 2020, after Defendant Matthews failed to provide additional footage and information about the alleged speeding.



he would not be handcuffed. Defendant Matthews also moved Mr. Monroe's hands towards Defendant Matthews' throat to make it look like Mr. Monroe was resisting arrest.

45. Mr. Monroe pulled his hands away from Defendant Matthews. But Defendant Matthews said ominously to Mr. Monroe, "I got you now." He again repeated that they had to do it "the hard way."

46. Suddenly and without any provocation whatsoever, Defendant Matthews drew his gun and pointed it at Mr. Monroe.

47. During this time of the fabricated choking, Defendant Matthews had his body camera turned off, ensuring that there was no video evidence of his actions.

48. Mr. Monroe, who believed the officer was trying to shoot and kill him, went back inside his truck for his own safety.

49. By the time Mr. Monroe got back into his truck, other LSP officers had arrived, including Defendant Conner and Defendant John Doe Officer.

50. Mr. Monroe feared that Defendant Conner, Defendant Matthews, and Defendant John Doe Officer (together, "Defendant Officers") were going to hurt him. He began honking his truck horn for help. Three people were standing outside in front of the casino, and a casino supervisor watched the incident through a window, but nobody came to help.

51. By now, Defendant Matthews had finally re-turned on his body camera.

52. Defendant Officers demanded that Mr. Monroe exit his truck. Mr. Monroe's mother, who was still on the phone, told him to get out of the truck to avoid getting shot.

53. After Mr. Monroe exited his truck, Defendant Officers moved to arrest Mr. Monroe. Defendant Officers did not read Mr. Monroe his Miranda rights.

54. Mr. Monroe asked why he was being arrested, but Defendant Officers would not give him any reason.

55. Without provocation or justification, Defendant Officers violently slammed Mr. Monroe to the ground and placed him face down on the street.

56. After Mr. Monroe was on the ground, all three Defendant Officers knelt on Mr. Monroe's back and legs, putting their entire body weight on him and pinning him to the ground.



57. Defendant Officers began beating Mr. Monroe. They then violently twisted his arms to handcuff him.
58. Mr. Monroe screamed and cried for help.
59. Because Defendant Officers were putting their entire weight onto Mr. Monroe, who was still face down, Mr. Monroe felt like he was suffocating.
60. Mr. Monroe began screaming, "I can't breathe!" He tried to gasp out these words more than twenty times while he screamed and panted for air, but his screams were ignored. Instead, Defendant Officers continued to beat him, even though he repeatedly pled with them to stop.
61. Even though Defendant Matthews was fully aware that Mr. Monroe had a heart condition, Defendant Officers disregarded all of Mr. Monroe's pleas. They all continued to put their entire body weight onto Mr. Monroe and beat him, preventing him from being able to fully breathe.
62. One of the Defendant Officers violently drove his knee with force into Mr. Monroe's kidney. This caused Mr. Monroe to urinate himself while pinned on the ground, as seen in the below picture:



63. While Mr. Monroe was pinned to the ground, he began to feel his chest tighten with extreme pain and discomfort.




64. After Defendant Officers handcuffed Mr. Monroe, they left him on the ground. Mr. Monroe continued to scream that he could not breathe, and he pled with Defendant Officers to help him.
65. Defendant Officers eventually lifted Mr. Monroe from the ground.
66. As Defendant Officers forced Mr. Monroe to a police car, they began to taunt him.
67. While inside the police car, Mr. Monroe felt extremely dizzy, hot, and lightheaded, and his entire body went into a cold sweat. Every bump in the road of the excruciating 45-minute ride caused him more pain. His hands and body were swollen, and he went in and out of consciousness. Mr. Monroe repeatedly asked the officer driving the vehicle to roll down the window, which the officer finally did after Mr. Monroe's repeated requests over the course of several minutes. Mr. Monroe later learned from LSU Health that he had suffered a heart attack.

The Aftermath

68. As a result of this violent incident, Mr. Monroe suffered fractures in both of his wrists, and permanent injuries to his shoulders and arms. Mr. Monroe was also declared disabled.
69. Mr. Monroe was denied proper medical treatment at Benton Jail despite suffering a heart attack in the police car ride on the way there.
70. At Benton Jail, Mr. Monroe begged the officers to take him to LSU Health for his injuries, but the officers told him "that wasn't gonna happen." The officers told Mr. Monroe he looked "bloated," yet refused to take him to the hospital.
71. A neighbor drove Mr. Monroe and his mother to the Emergency Room at LSU Health after he got out of Benton Jail. He stayed in the LSU Health Emergency Room for two nights until he could be admitted to the hospital. Mr. Monroe's doctor was not willing to let him go home because he believed Mr. Monroe might die from the fluid and bloating of his body due to the beating by the LSP officers, as seen in the below picture:





72. This incident affected both Mr. Monroe and his mother, who had been on the phone with Mr. Monroe before the beating occurred. Devastatingly, his mother, who had remained on the phone, also overheard her son suffering the brutal violence exacted upon him by Defendant Officers.⁸
73. The incident caused Mr. Monroe's mother a great deal of stress. She suffered a major stroke and 13 minor strokes as a result of this stress, and she passed away.
74. As a result of Defendant Officers' actions, Mr. Monroe lost everything that night. Mr. Monroe had been a casino dealer for over twenty years, and had previously passed every background check. But Defendant Officers fabricated criminal charges against Mr. Monroe, which meant he could no longer maintain his dealer's license. Mr. Monroe was fired from his job at Eldorado Casino based on these fabricated charges.
75. As a result of Defendant Officers' actions, Mr. Monroe now has posttraumatic stress disorder and experiences emotional trauma on a nearly daily basis. The terror, torture, and nightmare of the incident still haunts him to this day.
76. Mr. Monroe will never be able to return to a normal life.

⁸ Mr. Monroe's car door remained open after he exited his truck, allowing his mother to overhear Defendant Officers' attack of Mr. Monroe over his cellphone



Failure to Supervise, Investigate, and Decertify

77. Defendant Officers' unlawful actions could have been prevented had Defendant Officers been properly supervised.
78. Defendant Officers were hired, supervised, and trained by John Doe Supervisor(s).
79. On information and belief, Defendant Davis and Doe Officers were aware that Defendant Officers were not properly trained on using an appropriate and legal amount of force (if any) when making an arrest. Yet neither Defendant Davis nor Doe Supervisor(s) chose to act or intervene. Instead, they allowed Defendant Officers to continue carrying out their duties, despite knowing that Defendant Officers were not properly trained and, accordingly, constituted a danger to society. This ultimately harmed Mr. Monroe, as he was unlawfully beaten by Defendant Officers.
80. Alternatively, Doe Officers should have been aware that Defendant Officers were not properly trained on using an appropriate and legal amount of force (if any) when making an arrest because Doe Officers failed to investigate and supervise their officers on a regular basis. Indeed, when Colonel Lamar Davis (Defendant Davis) was asked whether he was "confident" that there was not another Ronald Greene case out there that LSP did not know about, he responded "[n]o, I'm not" and that LSP has "not looked at every video."⁹ Thus, had Defendant Davis and Doe Officers investigated Defendant Officers' actions, they would have known that Defendant Officers were a danger to society, including to individuals like Mr. Monroe.

PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST

81. Mr. Monroe, through his agent, undersigned counsel, submitted Public Records Requests for more information regarding the circumstances of his beating to obtain further evidence for this action. The record request sought:

- a. Records that can identify every officer involved in the Monroe Incident, including, but not limited to, an officer named Matthews, with a badge number of 2831.

⁹ See Jim Mustian & Jake Bleiberg, *In Louisiana, a father, a son and a culture of police abuse*, AP News (Oct. 25, 2021), <https://apnews.com/article/business-louisiana-race-and-ethnicity-racial-injustice-baton-rouge-d2d50979a247c400746ba6703225f7ff>.



- b. Any internal reports relating to the Monroe Incident, including, but not limited to, any reports written by the officers involved in the incident.
- c. All body, backseat, and dash-camera footage relating to the Monroe Incident.
- d. Any records relating to any investigation of the Monroe Incident, including the results of the investigation and the identity of the officer(s) who conducted the investigation.
- e. Any records that are open, open but suspended, suspended, or in any other status regarding any prior disciplinary proceedings instituted and/or complaints filed against the officers involved in the Monroe Incident.
- f. Any performance reviews, including emails regarding job performance and probationary evaluations for the officers involved in the Monroe Incident.
- g. Any records regarding any prior investigations of the officers involved in the Monroe Incident, even if the investigation was unrelated to the Monroe Incident.
- h. Any records regarding any trainings that the officers involved in the Monroe Incident have ever been required to attend relating to proper traffic stops, arrest tactics, searches and seizures, the use of excessive force, racial profiling, and/or constitutional rights.
- i. Any records regarding any mandatory training programs for officers of the Louisiana State Police Department relating to proper traffic stops, arrest tactics, searches and seizures, the use of excessive force, racial profiling, and/or constitutional rights.
- j. Any records regarding the number of complaints made against the Louisiana State Police Department for excessive force in the last five years.
- k. Any records regarding the number of arrests made by the Louisiana State Police Department in the last five years.
- l. Any records regarding the number of arrests and/or citations issued by the Louisiana State Police Department in the last five years for resisting an officer with force or violence.



- m. Any records regarding the number of arrests and/or citations issued by the Louisiana State Police Department in the last five years for battery of a police officer.
 - n. Any records regarding the number of arrests and/or citations issued by the Louisiana State Police Department in the last five years for assault of a police officer.
 - o. Any records regarding the number of arrests and/or citations issued by the Louisiana State Police Department in the last five years for failure to yield to an emergency vehicle.
 - p. Any records regarding the Louisiana State Police Department's policies and/or procedures for investigating claims of excessive force.
 - q. Any records regarding the Louisiana State Police Department's policies and/or procedures for an officer's use of force against arrestees.
82. In an email dated July 28, 2021, Adrienne E. Aucoin ("Ms. Aucoin"), counsel for the Department of Public Services and the Office of Legal Affairs, responded that LSP had "begun the process searching for documents" responsive to Mr. Monroe's request and provided notice that "the estimated time reasonably necessary for collection, review, and any necessary redaction of the documents which may be responsive" to the request would be "sixty (60) days."
83. On August 17, 2021, Lieutenant Melissa Matey, on behalf of the Public Affairs Section of LSP, produced just one document responsive to Mr. Monroe's 17 requests.
84. The single redacted document contained LSP's standard use of force policy. LSP did not explain the reason for the redactions or provide a written response regarding the legal basis for withholding other responsive documents.¹⁰
85. On September 20, 2021, counsel for Mr. Monroe served a follow-up Public Records Request to the Louisiana Office of Legal Affairs requesting a written response to Mr. Monroe's first Public Records Request. This second request once again listed all seventeen

¹⁰ Ms. Aucoin later indicated that LSP produced the single, redacted document to several parties simultaneously as the result of several outstanding Public Records Requests.



requests outlined above in Paragraph 84. It demanded that LSP produce documents responsive to Mr. Monroe's requests (or otherwise explain its basis for not producing documents).

86. On September 30, 2021, Ms. Aucoin left a message asking counsel to give her a call regarding the Public Records Request, and shortly thereafter, counsel and Ms. Aucoin conferred over the phone. During that phone conversation, Ms. Aucoin represented that LSP would provide a written response to Mr. Monroe's first Public Records Request, including LSP's basis for withholding responsive documents. She also represented that LSP would aim to provide a written explanation for the single, redacted document by the end of the week on October 8, 2021.

87. Despite Ms. Aucoin's representations, Mr. Monroe did not receive a written response from LSP regarding his first Public Records Request, or an explanation for the produced document's redactions.

88. On November 22, 2021, nearly four months after Mr. Monroe's first Public Records Request, LSP provided one additional document. The document described the basic training schedule of a police academy cadet and bore no apparent relationship to Defendant Officers. LSP's delayed response also did not indicate whether LSP had a statutory basis to withhold any documents.

89. Further, Mr. Monroe has still not received a written response from LSP regarding his second Public Records Request.

90. Mr. Monroe's counsel sent a follow-up email to Ms. Aucoin requesting a written response on October 13, 2021, and October 28, 2021. To date, there has been no response.

Mr. Monroe's Claims Are Timely Filed Because a Parallel Federal Lawsuit Suspended Application of the Applicable Two-Year Prescription Period.

91. Pursuant to La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3493.10, victims of crimes of violence have a two-year prescriptive period in which to bring a claim.¹¹

¹¹ La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3493.1 ("Delictual actions which arise due to damages sustained as a result of an act defined as a crime of violence under Chapter 1 of Title 14 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, except as provided in Article 3496.2, are subject to a liberative prescription of two years.")



92. Mr. Monroe’s assault by LSP officers is a crime of violence under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3493.10.¹² He was severely beaten by officers while he was defenseless, suffering fractures in both of his wrists, and permanent injuries to his shoulders and arms, as well as suffering a heart attack while being taken to Benton Jail.
93. Although this cause of action accrued on November 29, 2019—the day of the assault—Mr. Monroe filed a lawsuit in the federal district court of the Western District of Louisiana on November 24, 2021, raising these state law claims under the supplemental jurisdiction of that court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).¹³ That lawsuit suspended the applicable two-year prescription period for Mr. Monroe’s claim until its disposition on March 9, 2023.
94. Because Mr. Monroe brings this claim on March 10, 2023 — 4 days before the two-year prescription period expires on March 14, 2023 — his action is timely filed.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
L.A. Rev. Stat. § 14:37 – Aggravated Assault
(as to Defendant Officers)

95. Mr. Monroe incorporates by reference the factual allegations set forth above.
96. Defendant Officers physically attacked Mr. Monroe without any legal justification or Mr. Monroe’s consent.
97. During their attack of Mr. Monroe, Defendant Officers carried guns, and one of the Defendant Officers drew his gun and pointed it directly at Mr. Monroe.
98. Mr. Monroe feared for his life and reasonably believed that he was going to be shot and killed.
99. Defendant Officers’ use of a gun constituted assault with a dangerous weapon.
100. Defendant Officers also used the concrete ground and their bodies as dangerous weapons.
101. Defendant officers slammed Mr. Monroe onto the concrete ground with force, which caused Mr. Monroe serious bodily harm and could have killed him.
102. Defendant Officers also used the concrete ground and their bodies as dangerous weapons.

¹² Louisiana law defines a crime of violence as “an offense that has, as an element, the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, and that, by its very nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense or an offense that involves the possession or use of a dangerous weapon.” La. R.S. 14:2(13). Second degree battery is an enumerated crime of violence offense under La. R.S. 14:2(13).

¹³ *Monroe v. Conner et al*, 5:21CV03415 (W.D. La. 2021).



103. Defendant Officers slammed Mr. Monroe onto the concrete ground with force, which caused Mr. Monroe serious bodily harm and could have killed him.
104. After Defendant Officers slammed Mr. Monroe onto the concrete ground, they used their bodies to violently restrain Mr. Monroe.
105. Defendant Officers put their entire bodyweight on Mr. Monroe to keep him pinned to the concrete ground. While Defendant Officers were twisting and pulling Mr. Monroe's arms, one of the Defendant Officers violently drove his knee with force into Mr. Monroe's kidney.
106. Defendant Officers used the concrete ground and their bodies in a way that restrained Mr. Monroe's breathing, caused him serious bodily harm, and could have killed him.
107. After Defendant Officers slammed Mr. Monroe onto the concrete ground, they used their bodies to violently restrain Mr. Monroe.
108. Defendant Officers put their entire bodyweight on Mr. Monroe to keep him pinned to the concrete ground. While Defendant Officers were twisting and pulling Mr. Monroe's arms, one of the Defendant Officers violently drove his knee with force into Mr. Monroe's kidney.
109. Defendant Officers used the concrete ground and their bodies in a way that restrained Mr. Monroe's breathing, caused him serious bodily harm, and could have killed him.
110. Defendant Officers used the concrete ground and their bodies as dangerous weapons, and their actions constituted assault with dangerous weapons.
111. Defendant Officers' use of force constituted deadly force and could have caused death and/or serious bodily injury.
112. Defendant Officers' use of force was the proximate and direct cause of Mr. Monroe's injuries.
113. Mr. Monroe suffered actual physical and emotional injuries and other damages and losses as described herein, entitling him to compensatory and special damages, in amounts to be determined at trial. As a further result of Defendant Officers' unlawful conduct, Mr. Monroe has incurred special damages, including medical expenses. He may continue to incur other expenses related to further medical and other special damages in amounts to be established at trial.



SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
L.A. Rev. Stat. § 14:34 – Aggravated Battery
(as to Defendant Officers)

114. Mr. Monroe incorporates by reference the factual allegations set forth above.
115. Defendant Officers physically attacked Mr. Monroe without any legal justification or Mr. Monroe's consent.
116. Defendant Officers used the concrete ground and their bodies as dangerous weapons.
117. Defendant Officers slammed Mr. Monroe onto the concrete ground with force, which caused Mr. Monroe serious bodily harm and could have killed him.
118. After Defendant Officers slammed Mr. Monroe onto the concrete ground, they used their bodies to violently restrain Mr. Monroe.
119. Defendant Officers put their entire bodyweight on Mr. Monroe to keep him pinned to the concrete ground. While Defendant Officers were twisting and pulling Mr. Monroe's arms, one of the Defendant Officers violently drove his knee with force into Mr. Monroe's kidney.
120. Defendant Officers used the concrete ground and their bodies in a way that restrained Mr. Monroe's breathing, caused him serious bodily harm, and could have killed him.
121. Defendant Officers used the concrete ground and their bodies as dangerous weapons, and their actions constituted assault with dangerous weapons.
122. Defendants Officers' use of force constituted deadly force and could have caused death and/or serious bodily injury.
123. Defendant Officers' use of force was the proximate and direct cause of Mr. Monroe's injuries. Mr. Monroe suffered actual physical and emotional injuries, and other damages and losses as described herein, entitling him to compensatory and special damages, in amounts to be determined at trial. As a further result of Defendant Officers' unlawful conduct, Mr. Monroe has incurred special damages, including medical expenses. He may continue to incur other expenses related to further medical and other special damages in amounts to be established at trial.



THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
L.A. Rev. Stat. § 14:34.1 – Second Degree Battery
(as to Defendant Officers)

124. Mr. Monroe repeats and realleges every allegation contained in the previous paragraphs of this petition as if fully alleged herein.

125. Mr. Monroe asserts violations of Louisiana state law relative to intentional torts by the individual Defendants.

126. Defendants were acting within the course and scope of their employment with LSP.

127. Officers are liable for civil torts when they perform, “acts or omissions which constitute criminal, fraudulent, malicious, intentional, willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct.”¹⁴ Under this standard, “only the most egregious conduct by parish agents, employees or representatives that exhibits an active desire to cause harm, or a callous indifference to the risk of potential harm from flagrantly bad conduct, will rise to the level of ‘willful misconduct’ or ‘criminal, willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct’”¹⁵

128. While delictual actions ordinarily have a one year prescriptive period,¹⁶ there is an exception for torts which also qualify as a “crime of violence.”¹⁷ Under Louisiana law, a crime of violence is an offense that has, “as an element, the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, and that, by its very nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.”¹⁸ Second degree battery is a specific enumerated offense,¹⁹ and thus the two-year prescriptive period applies to such cases.²⁰

129. Second degree battery is a battery when the offender intentionally inflicts serious bodily injury.²¹ Serious bodily injury is bodily injury which involves unconsciousness; extreme

¹⁴ LA Rev Stat § 9:2798.1.

¹⁵ *Haab ex rel. Children v. E. Bank Consol. Special Serv. Fire Prot. Dist. of Jefferson Parish*, 139 So. 3d 1174, 1182 (La. Ct. App. 2014).

¹⁶ La. Civ.Code art. 3492.

¹⁷ La. Civ.Code art. 3493.10.

¹⁸ La. R.S. 14:2(13).

¹⁹ *Id.*

²⁰ *Creighton v. Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc.*, 214 So.3d 860 (La. Jan. 9, 2017) (Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s denial of two-year prescriptive period for second degree battery under La. C.C. art. 3493.10 and remanded the matter to the district court “to allow the parties to fully address the applicability of La. C.C. art. 3493.10.”).

²¹ La. R.S. 14:34.1.



physical pain; protracted and obvious disfigurement; protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or a substantial risk of death.²²

130. The attack upon Mr. Monroe is consistent with Louisiana's interpretation of a "crime of violence" and thus Defendants' conduct falls under the two-year statute of limitation of La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3493.10. As described fully above, Mr. Monroe was beaten by LSP Officers, who violently slammed Mr. Monroe to the concrete, twisted his arms, applied the full force of their weight upon his back, and violently drove a knee into Mr. Monroe's kidney, all while he remained in a defenseless position and pled with them to stop. As a result of this violent incident, Mr. Monroe sustained a heart attack while being taken by police to Benton jail, and he also suffered fractures in both of his wrists, and permanent injuries to his shoulders and arms. Mr. Monroe was also declared disabled. The severity of this attack escalated Defendants' conduct to second degree battery, one of the qualifying crimes of violence under La. R.S. 14:2(13).

131. Defendants at all times relevant hereto were acting under color of state law.

132. Defendants intended to inflict serious bodily injury. Specific intent may be "inferred from the circumstances surrounding the offense and the conduct of the defendant."²³

133. Defendants intended to cause serious physical harm to Mr. Monroe by hitting him numerous times without provocation.

134. As a direct and proximate result of the intentional acts of Defendants, carried out in reckless disregard, Mr. Monroe suffered physical injury and continues to suffer from emotional distress, anguish, sorrow, and loss of enjoyment of life.

135. The aforementioned physical and psychological injuries sustained by Mr. Monroe were caused wholly by reason of the intentional acts of Defendants as described herein.

²² *State v. Walker*, 53,975 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/30/21), 321 So. 3d 1154, 1162, reh'g denied (Aug. 5, 2021), writ denied, 2021-01334 (La. 11/23/21), 328 So. 3d 83.

²³ *State v. Walker*, 53,975 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/30/21), 321 So. 3d 1154, 1162, reh'g denied (Aug. 5, 2021), writ denied, 2021-01334 (La. 11/23/21), 328 So. 3d 83.



FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

**L.A. Civ. Code Art. 2315, 2320 – Respondeat Superior
(as to Defendant Davis and John Doe Supervisor)**

136. Mr. Monroe repeats and realleges every allegation contained in the previous paragraphs of this petition as if fully alleged herein.

137. At all relevant times, Defendant Officers were acting under color of law and in the course and scope of their employment with LSP.

138. Under Article 2320 of the Louisiana Civil Code, “[m]asters and employers are answerable for the damage occasioned by their servants and overseers, in the exercise of the functions in which they are employed.” Further, “[t]he master is answerable for the offenses and quasi-offenses committed by his servants, according to the rules which are explained under the title: Of quasi-contracts, and of offenses and quasi-offenses.”²⁴

139. The damages and injuries caused to Mr. Monroe are the result of the vicarious liability of Defendants Davis and John Doe Supervisor and their agent(s), representative(s), servant(s), employee(s), in violation of La. Civil Code Art. 2315 and Art. 2320. As a result of their vicarious liability and negligent supervision of Defendants Davis and John Doe Supervisor, Mr. Monroe, suffered emotional distress, humiliation, loss of enjoyment of life, and other pain and suffering.

140. To find a police department or supervisor liable for negligence in failing to properly train and supervise officers in question, a plaintiff must show “a pattern of similar incidents in which citizens were injured or endangered by intentional or negligent police misconduct and/or that serious incompetence or misbehavior was general or widespread throughout the police force.”²⁵

141. As previously stated, this is not the first time a black man has been attacked by LSP officers.

142. LSP has a long history of violence, discrimination, and police misconduct against Black people.²⁶ Just six months prior to Mr. Monroe’s attack, 49-year-old Ronald Greene was

²⁴ La. Civ. Code art. 2320.

²⁵ *Price v. Louisiana Dep't of Transp. & Dev.*, 608 So. 2d 203,209 (La. Ct. App. 1992).

²⁶ See, e.g., Timothy Bella, *State troopers texted about the ‘whoopin’ they gave a Black man, records show: ‘He’s gonna have nightmares,’* The Washington Post (Mar. 13, 2021, 4:29 PM), [20](https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/03/13/louisiana-police-black-man-text; Jim Mustian et al., Beatings,</p></div><div data-bbox=)



killed by LSP officers during an arrest and violent beat down. A subsequent cover-up by LSP sparked national outrage and multiple calls for a federal Department of Justice (DOJ) probe.²⁷ Moreover, external investigations have revealed a long pattern of racist violence and corruption by LSP.²⁸ Ronald Greene’s death, along with countless other less publicized cases, shed light on the rampant misconduct and brutality that has plagued LSP for years.²⁹

143. Under Louisiana law, a senior officer has a duty to properly and adequately supervise his subordinates.³⁰ As a direct result of Defendants’ lack of proper and adequate supervision over their subordinates, Mr. Monroe suffered various physical and psychological injuries, and continues to suffer from emotional distress, anguish, sorrow, and loss of enjoyment of life.

144. Accordingly, as a matter of Louisiana law, Defendant Davis, and Defendant John Doe Supervisor, in their capacity as Superintendent of LSP, and Supervisor respectively, are vicariously liable for all conduct of, or attributable to, Defendant Officers.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

L.A. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:1 *et seq.* – Violation of Louisiana Public Records Law (as to Defendant Cammon)

145. Mr. Monroe incorporates by reference the factual allegations set forth above.

146. Under Article XII, § 3 of the Louisiana Constitution and the Public Records Law, La. Stat. § 44:31, *et seq.*, a person has the right to examine public documents. In connection with the excessive force Defendant Officers used against Mr. Monroe, Plaintiff, through undersigned counsel, sought the previously listed public records from the records custodians of LSP, under Louisiana’s Public Records Law.

147. To date, the previously mentioned public records have not been received as required by

buried videos a pattern at Louisiana State Police, AP News (Sept. 8, 2021), <https://apnews.com/article/police-beatings-louisiana-video-91168d2848b10df739d73cc35b0c02f8>.

²⁷ Alanah Odoms et al., *Pattern-or-Practice Investigation into Louisiana State Police*, ACLU Louisiana (Aug. 27, 2021), https://www.laclu.org/sites/default/files/8.27.21_letter_to_doj_re_lsp_investigation.pdf.

²⁸ *Id.*

²⁹ Jim Mustian, *AP: Use of slurs not ‘isolated’ at Louisiana State Police*, AP News (Oct. 30, 2020), <https://apnews.com/article/race-and-ethnicity-louisiana-baton-rouge-racial-injustice-d7f77f196571892d71bd010ce4109677>.

³⁰ *See London v. Ryan*, 349 So. 2d 1334, 1341 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 351 So. 2d 171 (La. 1977).



the statute.

148. To date, the Louisiana Office of Legal Affairs has not: (1) provided notification in writing that it believes one or more of the requested records are not public; (2) provided identification of any of the requested public records that it is claiming an exemption for under the Public Records Act or any other statute; (3) identified any exemption it is claiming for any of the requested public records; or (4) stated its reasons in writing for believing an exemption applies to any of the requested public records as required under La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44:32.

149. To date, the Louisiana Office of Legal Affairs has not certified in writing that any of the requested public records are not immediately available as required under La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44:33.

150. To date, the Louisiana Office of Legal Affairs has not certified in writing that any of the requested public records are not under its custody or control as required under La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44:34.

151. The sixty-day deadline that the Louisiana Office of Legal Affairs set to provide the requested public records has passed. Yet, Mr. Monroe has not received any written response and has received just one responsive document.

152. Because Mr. Monroe did not receive all of the responsive documents, he served a second Public Records Request.

153. To date, Mr. Monroe has not received a written response or any responsive documents to his second Public Records Request.

154. On information and belief, LSP has withheld responsive documents without explaining the basis for withholding those documents.

155. Thus, Mr. Monroe has been deprived of his rights under the Louisiana Public Records Law and is entitled to injunctive relief and/or issuance of a writ of mandamus, attorneys' fees and costs, and damages, including the attorneys' fees incurred for bringing this action.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Mr. Monroe respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment in his favor and against each of the Defendants and grant the following relief:



- a. Award the Plaintiff compensatory and consequential damages, including damages for emotional distress, humiliation, loss of enjoyment of life, and other pain and suffering on all claims allowed by law in an amount to be determined at trial.
- b. Compensation for economic losses on all claims allowed by law;
- c. Special damages in an amount to be determined at trial;
- d. Punitive damages on all claims allowed by law;
- e. Reasonable attorneys' fees and costs;
- f. Pre- and post-judgment interest at the lawful rate; and
- g. Any further relief that this Court deems just and proper, and any other appropriate relief at law and equity.

Dated: March 10, 2023

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ E. Bridget Wheeler
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/s/ Meghan Matt
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Jean M. Lussier

Bossier Parish
Clerk of Court

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