CASE #66 – BROWN V. POUNCY ET AL. (SCOTUS)

The American Civil Liberties Union of Louisiana and Covington & Burling LLP filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States on behalf of Jarius Brown, an individual who was unlawfully beaten by DeSoto Parish police officers.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana dismissed Mr. Brown’s Section 1983 action against Defendants Javarrea Pouncy, John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 as time-barred under Louisiana’s one-year residual statute of limitations. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, noting that it was bound by existing Supreme Court precedent, and “only the Supreme Court” could clarify how lower courts should evaluate the practical frustration of a victim’s Section 1983 claim in states with statutes of limitations periods that are excessively short. Since the Fifth Circuit’s decision, two of the officers who attacked Mr. Brown have pled guilty to federal criminal charges stemming from the attack.

Before the Supreme Court, the ACLU of Louisiana and Covington argued that the one-year statute of limitations period that governs Mr. Brown’s case is inconsistent with the federal interests of Section 1983.  This case provides the Court an opportunity to resolve the question it expressly reserved in Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989): whether a one-year limitations period is inconsistent with federal interests. As the petition describes, a one-year limitations period fails to give victims sufficient time to bring their federal civil rights claims.  

The ACLU of Louisiana and Covington also argued that Section 1983 claims should be governed by the four-year federal residual statute of limitations period in Section 1658. When the Supreme Court previously considered cases like Owens that discussed the limitations period for Section 1983 claims, Congress had not yet passed Section 1658, and the Court was thus forced to employ a borrowing scheme under which 50 different state laws would govern plaintiffs’ federal civil rights claims. But the Court can recognize that Section 1658 now provides a federal solution that should control.

Four different groups have also filed amicus briefs urging the Court to grant Mr. Brown’s petition for a writ of certiorari.

Public Justice argued that, where state law gives a Section 1983 claim a shorter statute of limitations than an analogous state claim would receive, it impermissibly discriminates against Section 1983 actions.  Public Justice also advocated for application of Section 1658’s four-year catchall statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims.

The Law Enforcement Accountability Project (LEAP) outlined the practical hurdles that civil rights plaintiffs must overcome to file a Section 1983 lawsuit. LEAP also argued that the effectiveness and community trust of policing are enhanced when individuals can pursue and obtain accountability through civil rights suits.

The Institute for Justice (IJ) described its significant experience handling complex civil rights litigation and explained that a one-year limitations period is insufficient to fully vet and develop claims, especially in light of legal doctrines like qualified immunity and municipal liability. IJ also argued that lengthening the limitations period for Section 1983 claims would not open the floodgates of litigation.

Finally, the Orleans Public Defenders (OPD) illustrated the numerous practical challenges that civil rights claims face before they can bring a Section 1983 claim, including that many plaintiffs may need to navigate parallel criminal proceedings. OPD also argued that Section 1658’s four-year limitations period should control Section 1983 claims.

Mr. Brown is represented by Nora Ahmed at the ACLU of Louisiana and the team of Michael Imbroscio, Lauren Willard Zehmer, Sameer Aggarwal, and Caleb Ellis at Covington & Burling LLP. 

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